Eudaimonia is the Greek term for the best possible human life — a term usually translated as "happiness" in English, a translation that is accurate in one sense and deeply misleading in another. It is accurate in the sense that eudaimonia is what everyone is ultimately seeking when they seek happiness — the deep, stable, genuine form of it rather than the momentary. It is misleading in the sense that contemporary English happiness is almost entirely associated with pleasant feeling states — with subjective positive experience — while eudaimonia for the ancient Greeks was primarily about the quality of a human life as a whole, judged by objective rather than subjective criteria.
The distinction matters because it shapes everything about what the Stoics were recommending. If the goal is subjective positive experience, then the Stoic practices of preparing for adversity, embracing difficulty, and maintaining equanimity in the face of loss look like obstacles to the goal rather than expressions of it. If the goal is a life well lived in the objective sense — a life in which human capacities are fully expressed, in which one acts as a rational being should act, in which virtue is exercised — then the Stoic practices make sense as expressions of the goal itself.
The Stoics held that eudaimonia is the proper end of human life — that everything else we pursue, we pursue because we believe it will contribute to eudaimonia, while eudaimonia itself we pursue for its own sake. They also held the controversial claim that virtue alone is sufficient for eudaimonia — that a life of complete virtue is a completely flourishing life, regardless of external circumstances. This is the claim that generates the Stoic paradoxes, including the claim that the Sage is happy even while being tortured.
The Greek Background
The concept of eudaimonia is not a Stoic invention. It is central to the ethical thought of Plato and Aristotle as well, and the Stoic account is best understood against that background.
For Aristotle, eudaimonia is the highest human good, achieved through the exercise of human excellences (virtues) in a complete life. Aristotle's account differs from the Stoic one in an important respect: he holds that external goods — health, friendship, material resources, good fortune — are necessary conditions for eudaimonia, not merely preferred but genuinely required. A person who lives virtuously but suffers extreme poverty, serious illness, and the loss of people they love is, for Aristotle, not fully eudaimon, however admirable their character.
The Stoics rejected this position. They held that virtue alone is sufficient — that the genuinely virtuous person achieves eudaimonia regardless of external circumstances, because eudaimonia depends only on what is genuinely within a person's control, and what is genuinely within a person's control is their rational character, their virtue.
This is not merely a theoretical disagreement. It produces very different orientations toward misfortune, loss, and external goods. The Aristotelian orientation holds that you have genuine reason to be distressed by misfortune, because misfortune really does harm your wellbeing. The Stoic orientation holds that distress at misfortune is based on a false belief — the belief that what has happened is a genuine harm — and that correcting the belief corrects the distress.
Eudaimonia and Virtue
The Stoic claim that virtue is sufficient for eudaimonia rests on the account of what eudaimonia actually is — what human flourishing consists in.
The Stoics held that each kind of thing flourishes by exercising its characteristic function well. A good knife cuts well. A good horse runs well and carries its rider well. A good human being reasons well and acts in accordance with reason — that is, virtuously. Eudaimonia is the condition of a human being who is doing what human beings characteristically do, and doing it well.
This account of eudaimonia is function-based and objective. Whether you are eudaimon does not depend on whether you feel that you are. It depends on whether you are exercising your rational nature well — whether your character is genuinely virtuous. A person who is virtuous and lives virtuously is eudaimon, even if they are suffering external misfortune, because the suffering is not a failure of their characteristic function. A person who has every external advantage but whose character is vicious is not eudaimon, because their life, however comfortable, is not expressing the characteristic function of a human being.
The Stoics were aware that this account is demanding and that it conflicts with ordinary intuitions about what makes a life go well. Their response is not to soften the account but to argue that the ordinary intuitions are based on false beliefs about what matters — beliefs that can be corrected by philosophical argument and practice.
Eudaimonia and the Pursuit of External Goods
The Stoic claim that virtue is sufficient for eudaimonia does not entail that external goods are worthless or that their pursuit is irrational. It entails that external goods are preferred indifferents — worth pursuing through what is within your control while accepting that the outcome is not fully yours to determine — rather than genuine components of flourishing.
This is the point at which the account of eudaimonia connects to the doctrine of preferred indifferents and the dichotomy of control. You pursue health, friendship, material security, and the other preferred indifferents with full rational effort because they are genuinely worth having and because the practice of virtue often expresses itself through their pursuit. What you do not do is stake your eudaimonia on outcomes you cannot fully control.
Marcus Aurelius is the exemplar of this orientation in practice. He governed an empire, took his duties as emperor extremely seriously, cared deeply about the outcomes of his decisions, and invested enormous effort in the administration of justice, the defense of the frontier, and the welfare of his subjects. He did not treat these things as indifferent. He treated them as preferred indifferents — worth pursuing with full effort, not worth locating your eudaimonia in.
The practical consequence is the combination of engagement and equanimity that characterizes the Stoic ethical ideal: full engagement with the preferred indifferents that a given life makes available, combined with a relationship to outcomes that does not make your wellbeing contingent on them.
Eudaimonia and the Modern Understanding of Well-Being
Contemporary philosophical and psychological discussions of well-being distinguish several different accounts of what makes a life go well: hedonist accounts (a life goes well when it contains more pleasure than pain), desire-satisfaction accounts (a life goes well when you get what you want), and objective list accounts (a life goes well when it contains certain objective goods, regardless of how you feel about them).
The Stoic account of eudaimonia is closest to the objective list account but with a distinctive twist: the objective list is very short — it contains only virtue. Everything else that appears on the standard objective lists — health, friendship, knowledge, achievement — is either a component of virtue (knowledge, in the form of wisdom) or a preferred indifferent that is worth pursuing but is not a component of flourishing.
The Stoic account is also distinctive in its emphasis on the agent's relationship to their own situation — the quality of judgment and response — rather than on the content of the situation itself. What matters for eudaimonia is not what happens to you but what you do with it — whether your response expresses your rational nature or falls short of it.
Primary Sources
- Diogenes Laërtius. Lives of the Eminent Philosophers, Book 7. Trans. R.D. Hicks. Available via Perseus Digital Library.
- Cicero. On Ends (De Finibus), Books 3–4. Trans. H. Rackham. Loeb Classical Library.
- Epictetus. Discourses. Trans. Robin Hard. Oxford University Press, 2014.
- Marcus Aurelius. Meditations. Trans. Gregory Hays. Modern Library, 2002.
Further Reading
- Annas, Julia. The Morality of Happiness. Oxford University Press, 1993. The most thorough comparative treatment of eudaimonia across the Hellenistic schools.
- Long, A.A. Hellenistic Philosophy. University of California Press, 1986.
- Cooper, John M. Pursuits of Wisdom: Six Ways of Life in Ancient Philosophy. Princeton University Press, 2012.
- Rist, J.M. Stoic Philosophy. Cambridge University Press, 1969.